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Abstract
The primary purpose of the following study is to explore the impact of the process of democratization
on the international behavior of a post-authoritarian state. Suggesting the futility of any attempt to
mechanically extend the “democratic peace” argument to the countries that experience the process of
post-authoritarian transition, the study holds that the spread of democratic procedures has conflicting
effects on the international security. Thus while admitting the long-term benefits of liberal democracy
for the maintenance of international peace and cooperation, it is argued that, under the conditions of
transitional crisis and in the absence of consolidated democratic institutions and liberal norms, the
process of democratization makes governments more vulnerable to extremist pressures from below,
thus inhibiting their ability to comply with those international interests that are at odds with the
radicalized domestic preferences. Empirical evidence in support of this argument is provided through the
analysis of the evolution of Soviet–Russian foreign policy.
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In recent years international relations scholars have seen the rise of the literature on “democratic peace”
that breaks with the realist paradigm and elaborates the Kantian insight concerning the reduced
propensity of democracies to fight each other.1 Given the third and latest wave of democratization that
has encompassed several dozen countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the “democratic peace”
argument supports the optimistic portrayal of the future of international relations by suggesting that
more and more countries will become part of the “pacific union.”2
This study, however, attempts to qualify such an optimistic scenario. The literature on “democratic
peace” refers exclusively to the interactions among consolidated liberal democracies, while neglecting
the impact of the process of democratization on the international behavior of post-authoritarian states.
Nevertheless, paraphrasing Samuel Huntington who argues that, while modernity breeds political
stability, modernization leads to political decay, it is not unreasonable to suggest that, while democracy
promotes peace (with other democratic regimes), democratization may often lead to an increase in
international conflicts.3
The difficulty of applying the “democratic peace” argument to democratizing states stems from the
following two critical factors. First, as the third wave of democratization suggests, the implementation
of the procedural requirements for democracy does not necessarily mean that liberal institutions, let
alone liberal norms, are also being developed.4 The mere occurrence of periodic free elections does not
lead to the creation and consolidation of a liberal democracy. Liberal democracy presupposes a large
number of other characteristics, including the rule of law, an effective court system, and cultural
support for the position that minorities (political, ethnic, or religious) have the right to speak out and
insist on their views.5 When these requirements are not satisfied, it would be dangerously misleading
to portray post-authoritarian regimes as liberal. And yet, it is exactly on liberal institutions and norms,
which cushion radical foreign and domestic policy preferences, that the concept of “democratic peace” is
based.6
                                                                        
1. See, for example, Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (4) (1986):
1151–69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, “Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations,” Journal of
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3. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p.!41.
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6. The current literature on “democratic peace” distinguishes between structural and cultural explanations of the
democracy–war relationship. According to the structural model, it is democratic institutional constraints that prevent
democracies from fighting with each other. See, for example, Clifton Morgan and Sally Campbell, “Domestic Structure,
Decisional Constraints, and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (2) (1991): 187–211. In contrast, the cultural model posits
that an outbreak of war between democratic states is prevented by deeply rooted democratic norms operating in the political
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Second, in contrast to well-established liberal democracies, many of the countries engaged in the
process of democratization experience severe political, socio-economic, ethnic, and security problems.
In this situation radical foreign policy preferences are quite likely to gain popularity among masses, as
well as among elites. As the “diversionary” theorists postulate, under the conditions of crisis, political
leaders are likely to embark upon an adventurous foreign policy in order to distract popular attention
away from internal social and economic problems and to consolidate their own domestic political
support.7
Thus it appears that in democratizing states, which are faced with a large number of intense social
problems, nascent liberal norms and unconsolidated democratic institutions are not strong enough to
assure the “democratic peace.” Most importantly, however, the process of post-authoritarian transition
can actually contribute to an increase in international conflicts. For the purpose of this study, the
successful process of post-authoritarian transition is considered as being divided into three major stages:
liberalization, democratization, and democratic consolidation.8 During the liberalization stage, the
government, although remaining essentially authoritarian in form and substance, starts the process of
reforms by endowing the population with some political freedoms. The process continues to the second
stage, democratization, when a new government is freely elected and the procedural requirements for
democracy are more or less implemented. Finally, during the last consolidative stage, democratic
institutions and liberal norms become a normal and integral part of political life.
It is suggested in this study that it is exactly the second stage of post-authoritarian transition that
can be most threatening to the maintenance of international stability. During this stage embryonic
liberal norms and institutions have not yet been developed well enough to cushion radical pressures on
the process of foreign policy making that flourish under the conditions of transitional crisis. At the
same time, however, because of the implementation of the procedural requirements for democracy (most
importantly, free elections) the democratizing government becomes more accountable and, therefore,
vulnerable to such pressures from below. As a result the government of a democratizing state, while
perceiving long-term interests in upholding the rules, principles, and norms established by the
international community, is, nevertheless, forced to “defect” primarily because of the unleashed radical
domestic influences.
In game-theoretical terms, while virtually any government is forced to play a “two-level game”
responding simultaneously to domestic and international imperatives, the process of democratization
takes away the unique ability of the authoritarian government temporarily to ignore domestic
exigencies.9 As the unfortunate example of the Weimar Republic suggests, however, under the
conditions of a severe socio-economic crisis, domestic preferences can often fall prey to power-hungry
demagogues and political con artists who promise a confused and suffering nation easy solutions to
complex problems. Paradoxically enough, in such a situation the spread of democratic procedures
facilitates the conversion of radical domestic demands unconstrained by embryonic liberal institutions
and norms into a more aggressive foreign policy toward democratic as well as nondemocratic regimes.
What follows is an attempt to develop more fully the counterintuitive argument linking the
process of democratization to an increase in international conflicts. Note that this argument shifts the
level of analysis from the interactions between consolidated democracies to the foreign policy of a
democratizing state. While potentially generalizable to other cases (for example, Ukraine), this study
confines its empirical scope to the evolution of Soviet–Russian foreign policy.
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
process of these states. See, for example, William Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,”
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Critique,” in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 259–88.
8. This classification roughly parallels the three stages of the overall process of democratization outlined by Huntington.
See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 9.
9. For an excellent discussion of “two-level games,” see Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
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The Gorbachev Era:
Political Liberalization at Home and “New Thinking” Abroad
One of the few Western observers who did not rule out the possibility of the nonmilitary demise of the
communist regime in the former Soviet Union was George Kennan. In his essay written shortly after
the end of World War II, Kennan suggested that, under the conditions of containment, the Soviet Union
would gradually “mellow,” with its communist ideology proven inferior both domestically and
internationally to the Western ideas of democracy.10
Such an emphasis on the role of ideas in bringing down the communist regime and ameliorating
Moscow’s relations with the West has turned out to be quite insightful. Today, a number of analysts
trying to identify the sources of Soviet change ex post facto emphasize that, although by mid-1980s
most of the people in the USSR remained isolated from Western cultural influence, a relatively small
but influential stratum of Soviet population occupying high-ranking positions in the state became
intensively exposed to pro-liberal ideas coming from the West.11 Indeed, by the end of Brezhnev’s rule,
pro-liberal ideas, while always to a certain degree nourished by the social group that is usually referred
to as intelligentsia, gradually penetrated many Soviet technocratic circles directly involved in the
policy-making process.
This increasing pro-liberal orientation was especially conspicuous in those state institutions whose
activities were exposing them to the outside world. Some of the major Soviet “think-tanks,” such as
the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), were
unofficially promoting the ideas of nonclass-based foreign policy for nearly twenty years before
Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking.12 Communication with Western colleagues, participation in
international conferences, official and private visits abroad, were undoubtedly contributing to the
rejection of the communist orthodoxy. It should be noted, however, that such progressively popular
pro-liberal ideas included not only the principles of domestic democratic governance and the nonclass
vision of international relations but also the promise of a new lifestyle based on Western consumerist
culture.
And yet, this is not to say that immediately before and during Gorbachev’s years in power the
whole state apparatus was “mellowing.” In fact, the process of the acceptance of pro-liberal values and
norms proceeded quite unevenly. Thus, for example, the persisting standard operating procedures, as
well as the nature of activities, were firmly securing such organizations as the Ministry of Defense
from the penetration of Western ideas. And yet, ironically enough, it was exactly the strength of the
communist regime that was contributing to the popularity of Western cultural influence. Samuel
Huntington refers to this paradox as “negative legitimacy” that strengthens the support for pro-liberal
orientation by emphasizing the inadequacies and shortcomings of the existing authoritarian regime.13
In sum, the phase of political liberalization was characterized by favorable domestic conditions for
the integration of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union into the international community dominated by the West.
Most importantly, an increasingly powerful but still not prevalent pro-liberal orientation was combined
with the essentially authoritarian style of Gorbachev’s leadership that enabled him to fend off the
conservative interests of those individual and institutional actors who were still loyal to the communist
dogma. Gorbachev, for example, wasted no time using his initially unconstrained power to make
sweeping personnel changes in order to undermine any potential opposition to his policies by
appointing less conservative individuals to the most critical positions in the party and state apparatus.
A year after Gorbachev took office he appointed a new Minister of Defense, a new Chief of the General
                                                                        
10. George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (4) (1947): 566–582.
11. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” International
Security 16 (1991/1992): 74–118; Roger Kanet, “Reassessing Soviet Doctrine: New Priorities and Perspectives,” in Edward A.
Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds., The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World: Thermidor in the Revolutionary
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Staff and installed new men at the top of the Foreign Ministry and the Communist Party International
Department.14
Thus it was exactly Gorbachev’s authoritarian power base at home that safeguarded more or less
effectively the policy of New Political Thinking that stressed the nonclass, interdependent nature of the
international system from the assaults of hard-line communists. In other words, Gorbachev’s New
Political Thinking was the policy of a liberalized, but still authoritarian, elite that, for a variety of
reasons, was willing to make concessions in the international arena in order to achieve a more complete
integration of the Soviet Union into the “civilized international community” and that was ready to
resort to authoritarian power to get around all domestic obstacles in pursuit of this policy.
Yeltsin and the Process of Democratization
The first year of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency was characterized by conditions that were also highly
conducive to the liberalization of Russian foreign policy. The democratic euphoria and expectations of a
better life under the new regime were still strong among the masses, and the conservative political
elements were still in shock after the defeat of the communist putschists in August 1991. Encouraged
by these favorable circumstances and motivated by the desire to convince the West that Russia is even
more liberal than Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, the Russian Foreign Ministry based its initial policy on
the statement that Russia “has no enemies and wants to be friends with all countries.”15 Nevertheless,
shortly afterwards, the domestic situation started to change drastically, bringing about a dramatic
foreign policy shift.
With the intensifying socio-economic crisis, as well as the harsh psychological and material
repercussions of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian public espoused an increasingly
negative view of the process of democratization at home and rapprochement with the West abroad. It
became quite common for many Russians to argue that the government’s policy of economic
liberalization had a more ruinous effect on the country’s economy than did four years of war against
Nazi Germany about half a century ago. One of the leading Russian daily newspapers, Izvestiya,
emphasized the severity of problems facing Yeltsin’s administration by citing the rapid economic
decline as a primary explanation of the fact that for the first time since World War II the rate of
mortality in the Russian Federation exceeded the rate of birth.16
This growing dissatisfaction with the process of change was closely paralleled by the rise of
nationalist sloganeering that gave the Russian people an illusive sense of purpose and identity in a
rapidly changing environment. The progressively popular nationalist sentiments, however, often
spelled not only the end of domestic political and economic reforms, but also the beginning of an
aggressive policy abroad. Indeed, implementing a successful foreign policy campaign to defend the
“national interest” became more realistic and much more politically profitable for many aspiring, as
well as established, politicians than any, inevitably painful, attempt to resurrect the collapsed
economy. The “diplomacy of smiles” and the “policy of yes” became favorite targets for the right-wing
opposition that attacked Yeltsin’s government for “selling out” Russian interests to the West.17 The
primary focus of the most violent criticism of Russian foreign policy was, however, Moscow’s
allegedly liberal position toward other Soviet successor states.18
It should also be emphasized that since the collapse of communist structures, the Russian political
arena has been characterized by a low degree of institutionalization. Indeed, as the dramatic culmination
of the protracted power struggle between President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament in fall 1993
clearly illustrated, the process of development of a stable, consolidated system of government that is
                                                                        
14. Neil Malcolm, “New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe,” in Neil Malcolm, ed., Russia and Europe:
An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994), pp. 151–181.
15. Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s,” in Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven Miller, eds.,
Russian Security After the Cold War (Washington and London: Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 1–42.
16. Izvestiya, 30 March 1992.
17. See Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” International Security 18 (4) (1993): 5–43.
18. Jeff Checkel, “Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?” RFE/RL Research Report 1 (41) (1992): 17–18.
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capable of representing a variety of different interests is at its embryonic stage. As pointed out by a
number of analysts, political parties in Russia are largely underdeveloped. Rather than being
“protoparties” that will naturally evolve into full-fledged political parties, the majority can be better
categorized as “pseudoparties” in all probability doomed to wither away after a short period of
existence.19
Such a lack of political institutionalization, combined with intense socio-economic problems
associated with the transition to a free market economy, has created a situation in which the pendulum
of popular preferences rapidly goes from one extreme to another and militant programs (both in the
domestic and foreign realms) championed by extremist groups receive a frightening amount of popular
support. For instance, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who promised to restore Russia’s territory to the borders
of the former Soviet Union and expel “southerners” (that is, Armenians, Georgians, Uzbeks, and so
forth) from the Russian homeland, emerged as one of the major winners in the 1993 Parliamentary
elections.20
In fact, the situation in Russia has become quite similar to that in the Weimar Republic in which
a deep socio-economic crisis and psychological humiliation of losing World War I led to the soaring
rise of right-wing forces. For millions of Soviet people who proudly regarded the USSR as their own
state and homeland, its disappearance is a disaster. But for imperially minded Russians, it is also a
“national” catastrophe that is causing a deep psychological trauma.21 Russian grievances over the
collapse of the USSR have become further intensified by the highly publicized stories of violations of
human rights of those ethnic Russians (or more generally, Russian-speakers) who found themselves
outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation after the Soviet disintegration. Various constraints on
acquiring citizenship imposed by local authorities, language discrimination, the loss of former
privileges, and other explosive issues concerning the rights of Russians in the “near abroad” have
substantially radicalized the political process within Russia itself, thus providing a fertile soil for the
growth of nationalist sentiments.
At the same time, however, because of the spread of democratic procedures and the concern for
electoral support, Yeltsin’s government has become extremely vulnerable to the nationalist pressures
from below. Although such actions as the crack-down on the rebellious Parliament and the espousal of
a super-presidential constitution were intended to relax the impact of internal influences on domestic
and foreign policy formulation, the behavior of Yeltsin’s Russia abroad became increasingly reflective
of the strength of nationalist sentiment at home. “That which is now taking place,” wrote Russian
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in Izvestiya in June 1992, “is reminiscent of 1933 in Germany, when
some democrats began to adopt nationalist stances.”22
Perhaps, the most conspicuous example of such a change in Yeltsin’s foreign policy is a more
assertive, if not aggressive, stance toward the countries of the “near abroad.”23 The dominant
nationalist theme in Russia is that of “Moscow as the Third Rome,” uniting not only ethnic enclaves
of the Russian Federation but also the republics of the former Soviet Union. By effectively playing on
Russian nationalist feelings that have traditionally been associated with the idea of strong, unified state
leadership and by reviving imperial symbols (for example, a double-headed eagle), Yeltsin and other
politicians attempt to solidify their power. For example, in his speech in spring 1993 to the Civic
Union (an ad hoc coalition of former communist party apparatchiks and managers of state enterprises),
the Russian President argued that “the time has come for distinguished international organizations,
including the UN, to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and stability in regions of the
                                                                        
19. Richard Sakwa, “Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (31) (30 July 1993): 7–15.
20. Moscow Radio (8 December 1993).
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former USSR.”24 The essence of this statement is not much different from the declarations of more
conservative politicians who play the same nationalist card using, however, a more explicit vernacular.
For instance, as former Vice-President, and now active political figure, Aleksandr Rutskoi put it, “the
historical consciousness of the Russians will not allow anybody to equate mechanically the borders of
Russia with those of the Russian Federation and to take away what constituted the glorious pages of
Russian history.”25
The “nationalist shift” in Russian foreign policy, however, manifests itself not only in more
assertive statements. This rhetorical “toughness” is supplemented by the actual expansion of Russia’s
influence in the “near abroad.” Thus, for example, one of the major objectives of Russia’s increased
military involvement in the intense localized conflicts that have erupted in the former Soviet region is
to glue together the remnants of the collapsed union. Military presence in the republics of the “near
abroad” combined with their membership in the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) provides Moscow with a perfect opportunity to control domestic processes in the former
Soviet region. It is not surprising that other former Soviet republics have strenuously resisted Russia’s
efforts to establish permanent military bases on their territory;26 only after intensive economic pressure
bordering on blackmail do they concede.
For instance, the republic of Georgia, which is plagued by civil unrest, economic instability, and a
war against the secessionist Abkhazia, has been a relatively easy target for Moscow. The fall of
Sukhumi in September 1993 bolstered the strength of not only secessionist, but also anti-government
forces that supported former Georgian President Zviyad Gamsakhurdiya. Under these conditions,
Georgian leader (former Soviet Foreign Minister) Eduard Shevardnadze had no other option but to cave
in to Russian economic pressure.27 Until then Georgia had declined to join the CIS because it viewed
the organization as infringing upon its sovereignty. However, upon becoming a CIS member, Georgia
received the much-needed Russian logistical support against anti-government forces. Furthermore,
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev held talks with Shevardnadze on the “creation of three
permanent Russian military bases in Georgia in 1995 on the expiry of the present temporary agreement
on the status of the Russian troops currently deployed there.”28 Shortly afterwards, Russian field
engineers also began to prepare for the stationing of about 2,500 peacekeepers to be deployed between
Georgian and Abkhazian forces.
It is worth emphasizing that, with Georgia joining the CIS, the Commonwealth now includes all
former Soviet republics except the Baltics. In the opinion of some leaders of the newly independent
states (for example, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev), the CIS is needed to preserve the
existing links of inter-republican cooperation mainly in the economic sphere. In the opinion of others
(for example, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk), the Commonwealth’s sole purpose should
be to solve the temporary logistical problems associated with the disintegration of the USSR. For
Russians, however, the CIS is primarily a political, economic, and military mechanism to secure the
republic’s dominant role in the region. Not surprisingly, Russian diplomats have been actively
promoting the idea that the Commonwealth should be recognized as a regional and international
organization by such authoritative international bodies as the United Nations and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).29 With such a recognition, the Russian Federation’s
peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union conducted under the banner of the CIS would be
                                                                        
24. Quoted in “Russia Has No Special Minority Rights Claim,” The Christian Science Monitor, 14 April 1993.
25. Pravda, 30 February 1993.
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legitimized by the international community, thus institutionalizing Moscow’s preponderant role in the
region.
It is interesting to note that even Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who just a few ago
became famous in the West for his liberal views, now refers to the former Soviet republics as
comprising a de facto Russian dominion. Thus, for example, supporting the decision to send Russian
troops to Georgia on a peacekeeping mission Kozyrev has emphasized that “there is never a
vacuum—if we refuse to live up to our geopolitical role, someone else will try and clean up the mess
in our home.”30 In fact, even the high human (as well as financial) cost of Russia’s involvement in the
“near abroad” does not deter the implementation of Moscow’s grand plans nurtured in the atmosphere of
flourishing nationalism. Thus, for example, the Russian policy of bolstering the Tajik government in
its war against the opposition came under emotional attack in Moscow when 25 Russian soldiers were
killed on the Tajik–Afghan border. Instead of curtailing Russia’s military presence, however, this
incident had a completely opposite effect. At once, reinforcements of Russian troops were flown into
Tajikistan and Russian missile attacks mounted across the border into Afghanistan.31
The progressive “toughening” of Yeltsin’s foreign policy, as well as the results of the 1993
Russian Parliamentary elections indicating the victory of the ultra-nationalist bloc, suggest what often
has gone unnoticed in the West; it is exactly the severity of Russia’s problems at home that has been
driving Russia to behave more assertively abroad.32 Nostalgia for the old empire is growing among
many Russians disillusioned by the harsh reforms. Although Andrei Kozyrev, one of the most
consistent advocates of a Western orientation, has repeatedly denied any shift in his policies after the
recent Parliamentary elections, it has become increasingly clear that Moscow is much more eager to
respond to the nationalist mood of the Russian public than to the preferences of the international
community.33 Besides a more assertive stance with respect to the “near abroad,” Russian foreign policy
has also shifted perceptibly on a number of other issues. On the matter of fighting in former
Yugoslavia, for example, the Russians raised the issue of possible sanctions against Croatia, and
strongly opposed any international intervention against Serbia. As part of an effort to have Iraq pay its
outstanding debt to Russia, Yeltsin instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to improve relations
with Iraq.34 Moreover, Russia has also become extremely critical of what it perceives as the U.S.
tendency to dictate its own terms on the international arena.35
This is not to argue, however, that domestic developments in Russia are the sole determinants of
its foreign policy. In fact, as pointed out by the rapidly expanding group of scholars advocating the
integration of several levels of analysis, the role of international and domestic factors in shaping
interactions among nations is simultaneous and mutual.36 And yet, under current conditions, the
external pressure on Russian foreign policy formulation is far from being extensive. Therefore, this
study’s primary emphasis on domestic developments in explaining foreign policy change is not
unreasonable.37
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Thus, for example, for a variety of reasons most Western countries refrain from explicitly
criticizing Russia’s military involvement in the “near abroad.” In fact, as noted by a number of
analysts, the United States’ position on this issue is moving increasingly toward the idea of “Baltic
exceptionalism” according to which the Russians are expected to behave in complete accordance with
the norms and principles of international law in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in exchange for an
implicit carte blanche in other parts of the former Soviet Union.38 Such a position has not been
unnoticed in Russia, where Boris Yeltsin has repeatedly declared that “the world community” sees
Russia as having a special responsibility for keeping peace in the region.39
Moreover, the West has not attempted to influence Russian foreign policy by offering (not merely
promising) “carrots” either. Immediately after Russia’s independence, Russian liberals expected that
their accelerating rapprochement with the West would result in the blossoming of trade and massive
financial aid.40 Confronted with the discouraging indicators of their own economic performance,
Western countries have been, however, quite reluctant to extend their helping hand to Russia, thus
missing an opportunity to mold Moscow’s international behavior.
The more serious resistance to Russia’s more assertive foreign policy comes from the “near
abroad” states. Discussions have already taken place concerning the establishment of a common
security system for Eastern Europe that would include the former western republics of the USSR and
the former Central European members of the Warsaw Pact. According to Dmitrii Volskii, a liberal
Russian commentator, “the anti-Russian direction of the planned association of East European states is
absolutely clear.” He attributes the plans to nationalist political forces in Ukraine.41 Although Volskii
is correct that nationalists in some of the new states are motivated by anti-Russian attitudes, those
attitudes cannot but be reinforced by statements and actions of high-level Russian officials, including
the President, that imply a desire to recreate aspects of the old Russian–Soviet empire. In other words,
the Ukrainians and other East and Central European leaders are responding to views expressed in
Moscow—and to Russian behavior patterns that they see as threatening.
In sum, the spread of democratic procedures to the countries experiencing severe political and
socio-economic problems creates a potentially dangerous situation. Under the strong authoritarian rule,
as evidenced by the initial years of Gorbachev’s leadership, the government always has an option of
suppressing certain domestic preferences. Once in the process of transition, however, the democratizing
government essentially loses this “luxury.” As long as such preferences are not directed at the
radicalization of foreign policy, they do not present any considerable threat to international cooperation
and security. However, as the case of the Russian Federation suggests, this is not always the case,
especially under the conditions of transitional crisis.
Dilemma of Transition
The preceding discussion suggests an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to
argue that the extension of democratic procedures to the Russian Federation can in the long-run
contribute to the convergence of domestic societal preferences of Russia and the West. Note, for
example, that Karl Deutsch’s notion of “peaceful change”—the resolution of social problems between
states without resort to large-scale physical force—depends largely on the convergence of societal
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preferences.42 Deutsch argues that “peaceful change” cannot be assured without “we-feeling” between
nations, the sense of community involving partial identification in terms of self-images and interests,
the creation of what can be called an international civil society. It is important to emphasize that only
liberal democracies, with their support for civil societies at home, can allow for the convergence of
civil societies at the international level.43
On the other hand, however, the democratizing Russia is characterized by a substantial degree of
political instability and severe socio-economic problems. Under these conditions and in the absence of
consolidated democratic institutions as well as liberal norms, the spread of democracy (at least in the
short-run) makes the government more vulnerable to the radical pressures from below, thus inhibiting
its capacity to maintain international cooperation. The trick of resolving this dilemma involves getting
past the process of transition as soon as possible by finding a solution to the socio-economic crisis and
consolidating liberal institutions and norms. Until then, however, the democratizing government of the
Russian Federation, even while perceiving long-term interests of cooperating in the international arena,
remains, nevertheless, a hostage of virulent domestic preferences unconstrained by the embryonic
liberal institutions and norms and intensified under the conditions of transitional crisis.
The failure of the West to recognize this dilemma is likely to be fraught with grave repercussions
for international security. While the future of democracy in Russia as well as other countries
experiencing the process of post-authoritarian transition is primarily dependent upon their own inner
strength and resolve, Western countries can greatly facilitate the transition process and thus ultimately
promote international security by offering financial and technological assistance to the reforming
societies. After all, the cost of expanding the “pacific union” of democratic states appears to be much
less than the cost of the broken peace.
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